Nuclear Diplomacy in the ME

The current US Administration has been pressing the international community to impose sanctions on Iran for dissuading it from developing nuclear weapons. Iran has been party to NPT (Non-proliferation Treaty) all along. The Administration has, on the other hand, recently promised assistance to India’s nuclear energy program, although India is a nuclear power and is not party to the NPT. The distinction here is presumably one of military use as against peaceful use of the nuclear energy. Allegations regarding the Iranian program are suspect on the heel of the WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) intelligence blunder in Iraq. If however the allegations happen to be true then we need 1) to understand the true meaning of nuclear weapons and of the NPT, and 2) to find the appropriate method for eliminating the aspirations of countries to acquire the weapon.

1)    After the genie came out of the bottle at Hiroshima and Nagasaki it became clear that it cannot be put back in the bottle. It became clear that outlawing nuclear weapons was not going to secure us against atomic warfare. Eisenhower’s Atom for Peace initiative became imperative. NPT ensured that the nuclear powers would keep their nuclear capability, and sell the technology and the fuel to non-nuclear states for peaceful uses only under the control of international safeguards, in order to keep under control any desire by other countries to develop this capability. Atom for Peace, NPT and other treaties that followed meant legitimization thus regulation of nuclear capability, not their prohibition (unlike in the case of biological and chemical weapons).

Nuclear bomb was not used since its first and only use in 1945. Nuclear powers hold on to this capability to assert their superiority, because they know that there is no real trust in international affairs. Nuclear power states do not only refuse nuclear disarmament, they also refuse to commit to “no first use”, to “no use on non-nuclear states”, to “Test Ban Treaty”, and to “the prohibition of stationing nuclear weapons in other countries, in international waters and space”, on grounds of the UN Charter Article 51 provision of Self-defense. Of course, the same UN self-defense rule applies to other states, non-nuclear states, as well. An arsenal of 70.000 nuclear bombs was produced between WWII and 1992. * Fear feeds insecurity, insecurity arms race, arms race arrogance, arrogance fear, and the cycle starts over again. Of the non-nuclear states, some took refuge against a nuclear attack in an alliance with a nuclear power, either because they willingly opted out of going nuclear or because of their technological or economic inhibitions. Some non-nuclear states chose to go nuclear for an alleged reason of security.

The good news is that, ironically, the fear from the atomic bomb deters the use of the bomb. Its use against a non-nuclear country will invite an international outcry. Its use against another nuclear power will invite a nuclear retaliation. Therefore, it renders its use almost impractical. This so-called principle of “mutually assured destruction” renders nuclear weapons a deterrent rather than a practical arm. For the same reason, umbrella agreements between nuclear powers and non-nuclear states are not worth the paper they are written on, because the experience shows that no nuclear power would take the risk of nuclear retaliation for the protection of a country that may be under the umbrella of another nuclear power. Therefore, nuclear capability may be characterized as strategically desirable but militarily unusable. The nuclear weapon is more of a diplomatic arm than a military one; more an arm to twist arms than an arm to kill. The danger is therefore real but not imminent.

2)    The question is how can we stop the proliferation of this arm, which is proliferating despite the NPT? We need to look first at the political motivation behind having the nuclear capability, specifically in the ME. While every nation in the ME has a real or perceived fear from their far or near neighbors, most of them do not have either the financial, technological or manpower resources to develop nuclear weapons. Those that have all or some of the resources are India, Pakistan, Israel, and Iran.

India, regionally, is the most advanced in nuclear technology, it even has a PU separation plant, and it stayed out of the NPT. It is the refusal of the nuclear powers to denounce the use of and to dispose of their nuclear weapons that led India to develop the weapon, more than its conflict with Pakistan. India consistently requested these guarantees unsuccessfully since the beginning of the NPT negotiations. India does not have an aggressive foreign policy but a defensive one, in particular, towards China. India’s action, therefore, is simply the result of the discriminatory nature of NPT between the haves and have-nots, the refusal by haves to extend a non-use guarantee to have-nots.

Pakistan also has the nuclear weapons technology; although it is based on the bulkier weapons grade U rather than the PU source. It does not have a PU separation plant to produce weapons grade fuel. Pakistan’s nuclear policy is predicated by that of India’s. Its nuclear weapons program is simply to counter the Indian diplomatic leverage over the unsettled territorial issue in Kashmir. Pakistan cannot economically afford an aggressive foreign policy at any rate.

As to the case of Israel, the stupidly arrogant old British policy is behind the history of Israel as it is in the history of all other ME countries. For it encouraged nationalism in Arab lands, of all the unlikely places, as a war tactic against the Ottoman Empire during WWI; and at the same time it made the Balfour Declaration that promised a “national home” for the European Jewry. The British intent was to get rid of the internationally successful Jewry out and away from Europe, but this was executed during their instigation of unrest in the area. This was tantamount to building a lion’s den and throwing the pray in it. Israel, outnumbered by Arabs, had no choice but to arm itself. Arm itself it did to the extreme by developing the nuclear weapon with all the knowhow and connections available to it from all over the world. Therefore, the Israeli motivation is defensive. (But, the use of nuclear bomb in such a confined area as Israel is situated makes its use somewhat risky for Israel, because of the possible environmental effects on Israel itself caused by the atmospheric conditions prevailing at the time of the blast.)

Iran is quite a different case. It does not have nuclear weapons, or commercial power reactors. It is building an enrichment plant, allegedly for fuel for power reactors. Of course, if the enrichment is high enough to reach the weapons grade, Iran can also become a nuclear power. Iran has tense relations with Israel, Turkey, and Arab countries. As to its relations with the West, the short answer may be, aggressive no, anti-Western yes. There is a long history of anti-Westernism in Iran. After Muzaffar al-Din Shah sold the exclusive rights of oil exploitation to the British financier D’Arcy, in 1901, Britain signed an agreement with Russia dividing Iran between them. The agreement was suspended after the Soviet revolution. Later during WWII, this avenue was used to supply 5 million tons of American war equipment to Russia. In his book All the Shah’s Men (1950) Stephen Kinzer writes, “Britain and Russia had trampled on Iranian sovereignty for more than a century, and many Iranians naturally came to detest them both.” This was not all, when the Iranian parliament decided to nationalize Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. in 1951, Britain wanted to use military force to maintain its grip on the oil revenue, just as it would do a few years later after the nationalization of Suez Canal by Egypt. The U.S. intervened, as it would later in the Suez crisis, to apply a softer method; the Mossadegh government was overthrown by a CIA operation on the premise that it was leaning towards communist Russia. The Shah was reinstated to the throne, who resumed his dictatorship. Thus, the Iranian hatred of British was now joined with that of American. Secretary M. Albright, cognizant of this history, stated later in 1997, “The Eisenhower administration believed its actions were justified for strategic reasons. But, the coup was clearly a setback for Iran’s political development. And it is easy to see now why many Iranians continue to resent this intervention by America in their internal affairs.” D.F. Eickelman also states in his book The Other ‘Oriental’ Crisis, in Russia’s Muslim Frontiers, “The overthrow of Mossadegh and intervention elsewhere, however, shattered the image of the US as a supporter of democracy and national self-determination.” This is the history of the Iranian state of mind. Now, we further alienate Iran by declaring the Axis of Evil, they feel threatened by the presence of American troops on both sides of their country, in Afghanistan and Iraq. Hence, they put whatever technological and financial ability they have in the development of nuclear capability. Any forceful action on Iran now will only prove the Iranian claim of Western ill will, and will consolidate the Iranian people’s political will to resort to the alleged security of nuclear weapon.

In brief, the British foreign policy of WWI defined the current turmoil in the ME. Thereafter, the US has been perceived by Arabs as the successor to British ambitions and machinations. Therefore, the region’s countries are mistrustful not only of each other, but also of the West. Some ME countries may wish to resort to the development of nuclear weapons for the alleged security it provides. In reality, the nuclear weapon does not pose as great a threat as it is perceived, but is an effective deterrent. The West could help reduce the tension in countries that aspire to nuclear capability through diplomacy instead of use of force. We need to scale down the rhetoric of any real or perceived threat, and to adopt instead a policy that would offer to the region’s countries a reasonable amount of security.

September 2006

*Dismantlement since 1992 already cost billions of dollars, and a technological headache for the destruction and storage of the warheads. Existing few facilities in the world are enough to dismantle only about 2000 of them a year. It is estimated that it would take at least 15 years to dismantle the warheads beyond 3-5000 allowed to the US and Russia each. In addition, it would take 250 years to burn the material contained in warheads as reactor fuel in common reactors (1Gwe, 250 LWR reactors), excluding already existing stockpiles of Pu, and the 70 Mtons produced every year in the spent fuel of nuclear power reactors in operation. If the claims of both sides are believable, they stopped producing weapons grade material (PU and HEU) as of 1992. This would mean that they must have closed down the PU production plants and the Spent Fuel Reprocessing plants, and converted all the U Enrichment plants and the HEU power reactors to LEU facilities!!