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Dispassionate and Tepid International Approach to
Climate Change
197 countries met in Glasgow,
Scotland during Oct.31-Nov.13 for the Framework Conference on Climate
Change. Their Resolutions’ main points can be summarized as the recognition of the
emergency, alarm, and concern over the damaging effects of the climate change and
the calling on the financial institutions to help fight the climate
change. There were no direct action decisions to control the human activity
that cause the climate change like carbon and methane emissions, save the intention
to phasing down the use of coal for energy generation, and the call for
forestation.
The International community
has been discussing the environmental deterioration and climate change arising
from human activity since 1972 First Earth Summit where UNEP was established, and
1979 First World Climate Conference which produced the Transboundary Air
Pollution Convention. Among the conclusion of numerous conferences held since
(Glasgow was listed as the 26th such conference) in Kyoto in 1997
states revised their commitments made in 1995 to reduce carbon emissions
with some targets. Expectedly not having reached the set targets they convened
in Paris in 2015 to ratchet up the target pledges made.
Even fifty years after the first
recognition of the problem and setting up an organization to deal with the
problem, and after numerous meetings and pledges to solve it the world
community does not seem to have enough conviction of the severity of the problem
nor a determination to tackle it with the forcefulness it deserves. States once
again danced around the periphery of the matter while the noxious human activity
continued adding to the problem and people continued suffering the
consequences. They have the WMO to collect the climate data and the UNEP for
assessing the environmental consequences of that data. But they use this
valuable platform only to cooperate in the collection of data, in research, and
in discussing their findings.
Most of the UN system
organizations are of the same character as described above and they do an
excellent job for what is expected of them. Among them we can mention in
addition to UNEP and WMO, FAO, ITU, ICAO, IMO, UNIDO, UNESCO, UPU, WHO, WIPO,
WTO. There are also several research institutes and UN programs charged with
similar information exchange and cooperation functions. Of these WIPO and WTO, unlike
others, offer assistance in settling disputes between parties through some
settlement and/or arbitration mechanisms.
Yet, identified threats against human progress, peace or existence require an international system empowered with authority and an enforcement mechanism for compliance with adopted rules. Without embarking on a detailed presentation in this large subject we can safely say that there are only very few intergovernmental organizations with some kind of enforcement mechanism. They are ILO, Law of the Sea Convention, OPCW, IAEA. Of these ILO[1], and the Convention on the Law of the Sea[2], which oversee the safety of on-going human activities, exercise that authority by referring Treaty infractions to the International Court of Justice, OPCW[3] and IAEA[4] (including NPT), which are watchdogs against probable threats, by referring infractions to the UN Security Council for appropriate action. IMF/World Bank may also be considered as having some enforcement mechanism by virtue of the fact that their actions directly affect the economy of states concerned without involving interstate disputes.
Knowingly harming the
environment and/or the climate is an on-going observable and, in fact, recognized fact. It must be considered as a proven crime against the
well-being of humanity that concerns the entire world; even more so than the
protection of human rights and safety, or avoidance of threat of chemical or the nuclear mass destruction threat. Because if
there is no humanity there is no rights, just like wars. As to the nuclear
weapon threat, it is in reality a defensive, a deterrence weapon, its use is possible but not probable.
Therefore, while decisions of
the Glasgow meeting to call on the international financial institutions to
encourage projects against climate change are welcome, the empowerment of the UNEP
governing organs with an authority to take punitive actions against states in
breach of internationally agreed rules and of their commitments (as is the case
at OPCW and IAEA) would have been a more effective move at this late stage of
the problem which reached an exponential level.
November 2021
[1]
Part XIII of the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919 last amended in1997
(Being the Constitution of the International Labor Organization)
Article 29
Action on report of Commission of Inquiry
§
1. The Director-General of the International
Labour Office shall communicate the report of the Commission of Inquiry to the
Governing Body and to each of the governments concerned in the complaint, and
shall cause it to be published.
§
2. Each of these governments shall within
three months inform the Director-General of the International Labour Office
whether or not it accepts the recommendations contained in the report of the
Commission; and if not, whether it proposes to refer the complaint to the
International Court of Justice.
Article 30
Failure to submit Conventions or Recommendations
to competent authorities
1. In the event of any
Member failing to take the action required by paragraphs 5 (b), 6 (b) or 7 (b)
(i) of article 19 with regard to a Convention or Recommendation, any other
Member shall be entitled to refer the matter to the Governing Body. In the
event of the Governing Body finding that there has been such a failure, it
shall report the matter to the Conference.
Article 31
Decisions of International Court of Justice
1. The decision of the
International Court of Justice in regard to a complaint or matter which has
been referred to it in pursuance of article 29 shall be final.
Article 32
Decisions of International Court of Justice
1. he International Court of
Justice may affirm, vary or reverse any of the findings or recommendations of
the Commission of Inquiry, if any.
Article 33
Failure to carry out recommendations of
commission of inquiry or ICJ
1. In the event of any
Member failing to carry out within the time specified the recommendations, if
any, contained in the report of the Commission of Inquiry, or in the decision
of the International Court of Justice, as the case may be, the Governing Body
may recommend to the Conference such action as it may deem wise and expedient
to secure compliance therewith.
Article 34
Compliance with recommendations of commission of
inquiry or ICJ
1. The defaulting government
may at any time inform the Governing Body that it has taken the steps necessary
to comply with the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry or with those
in the decision of the International Court of Justice, as the case may be, and
may request it to constitute a Commission of Inquiry to verify its contention.
In this case the provisions of articles 27, 28, 29, 31 and 32 shall apply, and
if the report of the Commission of Inquiry or the decision of the International
Court of Justice is in favour of the defaulting government, the Governing Body
shall forthwith recommend the discontinuance of any action taken in pursuance
of article 33.
[2] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 Montego Bay
Part xv Settlement of disputes
Article 287
Choice of procedure
1. When signing, ratifying or acceding to this
Convention or at any time thereafter, a State shall be free to choose, by means
of a written declaration, one or more of the following means for the settlement
of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention:
(a) the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
established in accordance with Annex VI;
(b) the International Court of Justice;
(c) an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with
Annex VII;
(d) a special arbitral tribunal constituted in
accordance with Annex VIII for one or more of the categories of disputes
specified therein.
[3] The Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 1993 Paris
Article XII.- Measures to Redress a Situation and to
Ensure Compliance, including Sanctions
1.
The Conference shall take the necessary
measures, as set forth in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, to ensure compliance with this
Convention and to redress and remedy any situation which contravenes the
provisions of this Convention. In considering action pursuant to this
paragraph, the Conference shall take into account all information and
recommendations on the issues submitted by the Executive Council.
2.
In cases where a State Party has been requested
by the Executive Council to take measures to redress a situation raising
problems with regard to its compliance, and where the State Party fails to
fulfil the request within the specified time, the Conference may, inter
alia, upon the recommendation of the Executive Council, restrict or suspend
the State Party’s rights and privileges under this Convention until it
undertakes the necessary action to conform with its obligations under this
Convention.
3.
In cases where serious damage to the object and
purpose of this Convention may result from activities prohibited under this
Convention, in particular by Article I, the Conference may recommend collective
measures to States Parties in conformity with international law.
4. The Conference shall, in cases of particular gravity, bring the issue, including relevant information and conclusions, to the attention of the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Security Council.
[4] The Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 1956 UN
Article III: Functions
B. 4. Submit reports on its activities annually to the
General Assembly of the United Nations and, when appropriate, to the Security
Council: if in connexion with the activities of the Agency there should arise
questions that are within the competence of the Security Council, the Agency
shall notify the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility
for the maintenance of international peace and security, and may also take the
measures open to it under this Statute, including those provided in paragraph C
of Article XII;
ARTICLE XII: Agency safeguards
C. The staff of inspectors shall also have the
responsibility of obtaining and verifying the accounting referred to in sub
paragraph A-6 of this article and of determining whether there is compliance
with the undertaking referred to in sub paragraph F-4 of article XI, with the
measures referred to in sub- paragraph A-2 of this article, and with all other
conditions of the project prescribed in the agreement between the Agency and
the State or States concerned. The inspectors shall report any non-compliance
to the Director General who shall thereupon transmit the report to the Board of
Governors. The Board shall call upon the recipient State or States to remedy
forthwith any non-compliance which it finds to have occurred. The Board shall
report the non-compliance to all members and to the Security Council and
General Assembly of the United Nations. In the event of failure of the
recipient State or States to take fully corrective action within a reasonable
time, the Board may take one or both of the following measures: direct
curtailment or suspension of assistance being provided by the Agency or by a
member, and call for the return of materials and equipment made available to
the recipient member or group of members. The Agency may also, in accordance
with article XIX, suspend any non- complying member from the exercise of the
privileges and rights of membership.
TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Article III
4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.
