Nationalism “à la Turca”

Nationalism “à la Turca”

Many important events took place on Turkey’s historical calendar between 29 October and 10 November. November 3-5, 1914 are the dates Russia, England and France declared war on the Ottoman Empire drawing it into WWI; October 30, 1918 is the day of Moundros ceasefire between the warring parties and the start of occupation of strategic points in the Empire by the victorious Allied Powers; November 7, 1919 is the day the Turkish national liberation movement held first elections for a National Assembly (NA) independent from the Sultanate; November 1, 1922 is the day the NA abolished the Khalifate and Sultanate; October 29, 1923 is the day the NA declared the republican regime; November 1, 1928 is the day of adoption of latin script by the NA to replace the Arabic script (one of the most important reforms to challenge the nation for joining the contemporary civilization); on November 10, 1938 Ataturk died.

Therefore, there are many things for Turks to recall and reflect on at this time of the year. I chose to reflect this year on the most important of the reforms and in fact the driving force behind all of them, the “Turkish nationalism”. Nationalism was a reform in Turkey, because it did not exist in the second half of the long existence of the Ottoman Empire. “Turkish nationalism” was a reform that made the other reforms possible on the path to modernization (joining the contemporary civilization)*. Furthermore, I find this subject topical, because the current Islamist administration is claiming to be nationalist. The administration may be assuming this role in order not only to attract the votes of nationalists in the country, but also to find a solution to the Kurdish insurgence, to the Pheneriote Orthodox Church’s efforts to gain ecumenical status, and to the increasing demands by Alevis for recognition.

However, we need to consider and learn what this Islamist government means by nationalism. Based on the Government’s past and continuing record, I assume that their nationalism must be for the recreation of the Ottoman style nations, millets. They must believe in the ummet/millet system of society (panislamist view), to conform to their Ottomanist domestic and foreign policies, regardless of their public rhetoric. Their actions prove without a doubt that their aspiration is to establish a political and economic leadership over the Muslim countries in the Middle East and Africa. They have already succeeded in reinstating Ottomanism in Turkey by re-interpreting the secular and democratic principles of the state, by re-engineering the social and judicial systems. There is no reason why they cannot succeed in reintroducing the millet system by way of reinterpretation of nationalism.[1] The current international events are such that Turks and the international community are all ready to accept such an interpretation.

A cursory look at the history of “Turkish nationalism” would be sufficient to verify this view. Seljuks, later Ottomans, kept their Turkish character from the 12^th to the 16^th century as they were expanding.[2] When the state assumed the religious mantle of khalif after conquering Mecca in 1517, it started to pursue a policy based mainly on religion. Having spread over a large mass of land and sea, the Empire consisted of numerous different nations, cultures, and religions. Co-religionists were ummet. Non-muslims were “nations”, millet. The identity of citizens was recognized by their religious affiliation, not by their language, nationality, or land. Turkishness was forgotten, even suppressed, for fear of inciting nationalism among many nations living within the Empire.[3] Leaders were well aware that a society based on religious foundation made people subservient to the state; unquestioning adherence to religion impeded people from believing in themselves, thus from owning the state.

 Turkish intelligentsia in the Ottoman Empire rediscovered their Turkishness in the 19^th century. The first Ottoman Constitution of 1876 stipulated in its Article 18 that the State’s official language was Turkish, and in Article 57 that the parliamentary debates were to be made in Turkish; an Executive Order in 1894 mandated the teaching of Turkish in all schools, including foreign schools.[4] That was the century in which nationalism and nation-state concepts spread around the world as a result of the American and French popular uprisings for freedom, individual rights and equality. Nationalism became the social bond. Millets in the Empire also could not be kept isolated and away from this current. It was natural for them to rally around their national identity, and to seek independence with the help of countries dedicated to ending the Ottoman hurdle in the way of the modernizing world. This trend included several co-religionist Arab nations, despite the fact that Ottomans served as their protective guardians for about 400 years. Such was the reliance on ummet system: Nationalism had trumped religion. Turks in the Empire were left empty handed. “The Emperor was naked”. The intellectuals in the Empire and some sultans began in 1830s to embrace Turkish nationalism in order to rescue the crumbling Empire. But, the religious community upset every modernization attempt with violent oppositions.[5]

It was not until 1920 that Turks finally realized they had to dislodge religion from its pedestal to be able to reclaim their own identity, to reinstate the sovereignty of the people, and to catch-up with ever-advancing contemporary civilization. They made a historically unprecedented élan to embrace nationalism in order to fight a war for their independence, and thereafter to start on a path to contemporary modernization, all within a period of twenty years. Drastic and dramatic changes were like instating peoples’ sovereignty (secularism, republican regime), solidarity for independence (nationalism), individuals’ rights and freedom, women’s equality, starting up a new industry with state assistance, the adoption of a latin script that opened the society to the world-culture and -science (progress). The type of nationalism (called Ataturk nationalism) that was the formidable force behind all this incomparable achievement, was based on history, not on ethnicity, chauvinism, nor religion. Public solidarity based only on nationalistic feelings was what carried Ataturk to the national liberation, and energized the people to support the reforms.[6]

Unfortunately, this relentless modernization process based on national solidarity lasted only for a very short period of approximately twenty years. Having realized this feat about one hundred years later than the Western world did, Turks encountered another setback due to changing circumstances in the intervening period. German nationalism and dictatorship dragged the world to the disastrous WWII. The international community condemned nationalism. The Nazi style racist nationalism attached a stigma to the very important and useful social fact of nationalism. Yet, there is no point in continuing to vilify and bash nationalism because of a short-lived aberration in history (1930-45). Nationalism is a natural and historical fact arising from the social need for solidarity. Nationalism gave life to many countries in the world, and it continues to do so in many countries under more politically correct names, like patriotism, national interests, etc. Nationalism is the natural binding element in a society, if removed it has to be replaced by another  kind of social binding element. Religion lurking behind the curtain of history is always ready to jump in. And, it has; religiosity has been on the rise in many countries, west and east, since WWII.

Turkey also having started the process in 1940s finally put religion back on the pedestal in 2002 by electing the Islamist party to govern the country. True to the times, the religionists did not reverse the course to membership in universal civilization by Ottoman style uprisings and atrocities, but by modern day democratic elections. Nevertheless, the result was the same, a setback on the way to contemporary universal civilization. This was yet another example of an almost two hundred year old wavering attitude (irresoluteness) of the Turks towards “nationalism”. Although reforms were achieved at a vigorous pace within the first twenty years of the Republic, reforms were not advanced, and not even maintained in the following sixty years. The religionists took advantage of the neglect and slowly but surely made inroads to Turkish politics. They crowned their hard work in 2002 by capturing power. Ever since, the religionists started diligently to meddle with the reforms, not to abolish them outright, but to redefine them according to their “book”.

It appears that the Turkish character is not conducive to sustaining nationalist solidarity. This may be due to Turks’ individualistic mentality and life style. Turks have never developed a tradition of community, a notion of social service, interdependence, and altruistic volunteerism. Therefore, casting doubt on nationalism, instead of promoting it, easily erodes and eventually will weaken solidarity within the Turkish society. Solidarity, which is the lifeline of national security and the motor force behind national development along the contemporary universal civilization, is undermined.[7] This is a worse case scenario for a nation. Neither the international community’s current attitude towards “nationalism”, nor the current Turkish administration’s interpretation of it are encouraging to avoid that scenario. One cannot help but ask the Turkish administration whether the justification for their foreign policy re-oriented from the West towards the South is based on the perfidious act of Arabs during WWI? Whether the current Turkish aspiration for leadership of the Muslim world is based on the facts of Ottomans’ rise or fall? What type of solidarity would they rely on, the nationalistic one that gave independence and contemporary civilization to them, or the religious one that did not help keep Ottoman Empire together?

In the face of nationalist and religionist uncertainties in Turkey, Turks will be well served if they would remember that although they have been Muslims by choice for about one thousand years, they were born Turks by nature for at least four thousand years. Societies are composed of smaller social units, groups or communities (professional, local, racial, religious, etc.), also classes in societies are unavoidable; but, all these components need a binding element to be complementary of each other, in order to avoid clashes and be able to develop and live in peace. That binding element is solidarity; solidarity is what holds a society together. The type of solidarity determines the type and durability of a society. Solidarity based on national bonds is the most natural and durable. It becomes vitally important to reflect on this history for a nation who will soon be presented with a new social contract, the Constitution, re-written by the admirers and aspirers of the Ottoman ways.

October 29, 2012 

*I feel obliged to emphasize or explain some of the terms because politicians and some commentators have the habit of twisting the meaning of certain words for their own purposes.

[1]  “The current administration has been showing a nationalist face since the last election. It dons a nationalist mantle in order to survive between the two nationalist groups appeared in the country because of a Kurdish movement surging in the last twenty years. ….. It will achieve what the earlier ruling parties could not; it will assume Ataturk nationalism, however, with a redefined Ataturk nationalism ….” (free translation from “Kimligimiz ve Niteligimizin Bekcisi”, by the Author, sosyopolitikkonu.blogspot.com, Sept. 2008)

             [2] See S. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol. I, Cambridge U. Press 1976. O. Turkdogan, Kemalist Sistem, Alfa 1999. And, Bozkurt Guvenc, Turk Kimligi, Remzi Kitabevi 4^th edition 1996.

[3] Regarding the avoidance by late Ottomans the usage of the word Turks, although it was used by foreign observers, see T. Feyzioglu, Ataturk ve Milliyetcilik, TC 75 Yil Armagani, TTK 1998, p.8; See also O. Turkdogan, , pp. 37, 38, 80, 254-257.

[4] O. Turkdogan, p. 47. About the rise of conscience and appreciation of the Turkish language during the late Ottoman era, see O. Turkdogan, pp. 53, 76, 77.

[5]  “There were reformers and reforms at crucial times during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. But even the most intelligent and perceptive of Ottoman reforms at this time adhered to the basic premise that the Ottoman system was far superior to anything that the infidel might develop …” (S. Shaw, p. 175)

              “He (Osman II) believed the sole remedy for these conditions was to ‘Turkify’ both the palace and the Janissary corps. ….. He also seems to have thought of moving the Ottoman government from the devsirme center of Istanbul to some place in Anatolia where Turkish traditions and values would prevail, perhaps to Bursa or Ankara, thus presaging the reforms of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk by some three centuries. ……. Janissaries broke into the palace (May 19, 1622) …. Osman deposed and later assassinated and Mustafa I restored to the throne. The reign of Osman II ended without any of his goals being realized; moreover the assassination of a ruling sultan set a new precedent that would be followed all too frequently in subsequent years.” (Shaw, p. 192, 193)

                 “Opposition to the sultan (Selim III) had been building for a long time. The Janissaries and others threatened by his reforms had been agitating since early in his reign. Opposition also came from the ulema, most of whom considered every innovation to be a violation of Islamic law…. The revolt broke out in late May 1807 when the Janissary auxiliaries (yamaks) guarding the Bosphorus forts at Buyukdere, led by Kabakci Mustafa, assassinated a Nizam-I Cedit officer …..joined as they went by thousands of Janissaries, ulema, religious students, and others ….. to secure a fetva  declaring Selim’s reforms illegal violations of religion and tradition and authorizing his deposition.” (Shaw, p. 273, 274)

The Istanbul Observatory built in 1575, only 32 years after the death of Copernicus, and four years before the birth of Kepler, was demolished by a fetva of the Seyhulislam (the high priest) as being against Sharia. (See, T. Feyzioglu, Ataturk Yolu, 3^rd edition, Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1995, p.18)

“When geography classes were introduced in newly founded middle schools after the declaration of Tanzimat reforms sultan’s son-in-law, Sait pasha, told the sultan that showing maps in geography classes is an infidel practice, not allowed by Sharia law. We need to recall that the world’s famous map was drawn many centuries earlier by the great Turkish seafarer Piri Reis in 1513.” (free translation by the Author from T. Feyzioglu, p. 26)

While Jewish, Armenian and Greek millets founded their printing houses between 1494 and 1627, a fetva for founding the first Turkish printing house was issued in 1727. (see T. Feyzioglu, p. 14)

[6] “The principle of nation state defended by the Kemalist system has for its objective organizing and modernizing the society. “ (free translation by the Author from O. Turkdogan, p.113)

 “If there were no Turks there would not have been Ataturk.” (free translation by the Author from a poem by Behcet Kemal Caglar. T. Feyzioglu, Ataturk ve Milliyetcilik, p.31)

[7]  “Turkey seems to have lost its rudder in the pluralist political storm. There seems to exist an uncertainty in Turkish national will, national unity, and national identity. A divided and confused society can no longer take control of its own affairs (democracy); the administration fills in the vacuum and takes charge with an iron fist (autocracy).” (Adulteration of National Identity, by the Author, sociopoliticalviews.blogspot.com, Sept. 2009)

Ras-Putin and Turkey a la putinese

Ras-Putin* and Turkey a la Putinese

Modern history witnessed five empires: The British Empire built on naval power and deceitful foreign policies, the Napoleonic Empire built solely on military power, the Austro-Hungarian Empire built more on diplomacy than military, the Russian Czarist (subsequently the Soviet) and the Ottoman Empires built on military power as well as on a unique type of local autonomy for invaded lands. The French, and Austrian Empires were relatively short lived because of their dependence more on military force or on diplomacy. The British and Ottoman Empires having combined the two elements, more successfully than Russia did, lived longer. They all ultimately succumbed to people power, democracy. The only empire that replaced all the above after a series of two world wars is the USA, built on democracy and business power.

British, French and Austrian empires are gone for good, never to come back. The British because it was rooted in overseas resources, and the hatred it created for its manipulative administration of locals; the French empire was both in overseas and in Europe but never established roots with a strong imperial administration; the Austrian could never reach too far geographically at any rate, and depended only on the balance between other powers because of its geographically central position (like Germany that also tried to play imperialism for a short period). Both Russians and Ottomans rooted their empires on the peripheral lands, therefore could hold a closer grip on the administration of different nations. It has been almost one hundred years since the demise of the Ottoman Empire, and now having been confined to only a core land, and having undergone a substantial transformation to modernity it cannot be expected to come back either. As to the Russian Empire, it has been only a couple of decades since its collapse (in its Soviet form), and its deprivation from its imperial lands is not yet clear cut; it is too early to determine whether it will not be resurrected. Putin seems to be aware of this possibility, and to be trying to give it a chance.

Domestically, Putin brought under his control big money and big businesses (that quickly formed during the chaotic unraveling of the Soviets) by tyrannizing the oil/gas barons and financial businesses. He courted the clergy and obtained their support. Revenues from oil and gas relatively enriched the people, and the liberation of religious practices enriched the peoples’ souls. Thus, he was able to rally enough public support for holding on to power under the cloak of democracy. He could then use the authority entrusted to him by democratic means to crush democratic rights of dissenting journalists, protests and demonstrations.

Internationally, after a hiatus of Yeltsin years, Putin managed to keep Belarus and Kazakhstan close to the center, did not hesitate to use brut force to keep Georgia and Ukraine from spinning further away from the center, used old Russian tactics of exploiting domestic difficulties in Moldova, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kirgizstan in order to keep them unstable thus in need of external support, naturally the support of the old “protector” Russia. He cleverly made sure also that Russia stays on the unstable Middle Eastern stage by keeping a naval base in Syria and a financial base in the Greek Cyprus. Accordingly, Putin maintains Russia’s international power broker or tiebreaker position. He occasionally does not hesitate to refer to Russia’s old greatness, paying special attention to St. Petersburg, the old Czarist capital. All these things put together suggest a Putin aspiration to restore the Russian Empire, albeit in conformity with the prevailing world circumstances. This and the similarity in the name certainly brings to mind the Rasputin autocracy in the house of Romanovs.

We observe a parallel development in Turkey that burgeoned during roughly the same period. The PM of the Islamist government (RTE) that came to power in 2003 also brought big money and businesses under his control by tyrannizing them. In this case, the control came by selling state owned lands or businesses to cronies under the pretext of privatization, by opening business opportunities abroad for cronies, and by appointing cronies to the Boards of several banks. He could not establish a pact with clergy like Putin did, because there is no clergy in Islam. However, he could build even a larger and stronger religious base by exploiting religion within the 99% Muslim population. He blatantly broke away with the constitutional requirement of secularism and tied his political moves to religious beliefs at every step of the way. He was thus able to obtain the support of 35% at first and then gradually up to 50% of the voters. With this democratically obtained mandate, he started to rule the country single handedly. The legislature, judiciary, and academia all came under the fold. He interprets the election results as the public will, and suppresses dissenting journalists, protests and demonstrations for going against the public will. This autocracy is presented as democracy at its best.

In foreign policy, the Turkish PM rekindled relations with the neighboring countries that were Ottoman lands for centuries. These relations had been on ice during the republican reformist administrations after the Ottoman demise, and the founding of several states in its place by the Western powers. The new relations are, of course, based on business opportunities and religious brotherhood. The PM assumed the self designated leadership of Muslim countries in his dealings with the West, and promotes democracy in those Islamic countries to secure the approval of the West. Of course, the West is not aware that the democracy in question here is democracy a la Islam or a la Putinese.

Like Putin, RTE also aspires to a leading role in the ME imbroglio. The difference between them is that while Putin tries to catch the European winds, RTE sails with the US winds. Nevertheless, it is the wind that blows from the west in both cases. RTE takes advantage also of the Western Islamophobia for acting as the leader of Muslim countries in facing the West, and for leading the Western countries to the trap of Interfaith dialogue (which means peacefully invading the West from within by the West’s own terms of freedom and equality).

The Turkish PM also, like Putin does for the Czarist grandeur, does not hesitate to express occasionally his longing for the Ottoman era, the Ottoman greatness. He gradually replaced the celebration of Republican period events with the celebration of Ottoman events, of Sultans or of pre-republic popular figures. He expands Istanbul’s (the old Ottoman capital) already top-heavy richness compared to the rest of the country by investing in the city’s infrastructure and by moving the country’s financial center there. Several construction mega- projects conceived by Sultans are brought back to the drawing board with big fanfare.

At this point one would ask how are the relations between these two countries . They were historical enemies. The Turkish republican period kept a friendly but cautious relation with Russia, because Russia’s desire to dominate Turkey had never faded away. The Turkish Islamists did not establish a military and strategic alliance with Russia, because they need to maintain these ties with the US for their ultimate objectives, but they established strong trade and economic ties with Russia. There are big Turkish construction firms and projects in Russia, and gas supplies from Russia to Turkey, as well as the construction of a nuclear power plant by Russia in Turkey. Relations between the two men are better than either has with many other leaders in the world. It is one of the coincidences in history where democratic circumstances created two autocratic megalomaniacs at the same time. The history will eventually witness how Ras-Putin and Turkey a la putinese will evolve. The West will have a chance to taste (T)urkey a la putinese.
* “Ras” means local leader in Ethiopian. May 31, 2012