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Wednesday, September 1, 2010

Islamization of Turkey

Islamization of Turkey


Dear Stratfor Editor,

Congratulations for your excellent research article of August 23rd regarding the Islamization of Turkey. Your article is an invaluable addition to the recent compendium of Western articles written in a similar vein. Warnings given in numerous letters to some Western leaders and in media articles written by some Turkish intellectuals since 1990s fell in deaf ears. Hopefully, the observations and analysis of Western writers will awaken the Western supporters of the current Turkish regime to the consequences of Islamization of Turkey. The recent news that the State Department belatedly has launched a study of the turn of events in Turkey may be a good omen.

I would like to take the liberty of making a few observations on your most welcome article, in an attempt to complement it:
In the second paragraph it is stated “Islamist-oriented Anatolia”. It may have been a more accurate statement to say “Islamist-steered Anatolia”. Anatolian masses have not been ostentatiously practicing Muslims in the model of Arab Muslims. There are historical, cultural and practical reasons for this. To give an example of practical reasons, for the sake of brevity, it may be noted that Turks cannot read the Koran written in Arabic and claimed by Muslim clerics themselves to be untranslatable. Until 1950s mosques were far and few between in villages and towns. Religiosity was fanned among the uneducated masses after the introduction of multi-party system in 1945. Parties exploited religious feelings ever since, for political advantage. Therefore, today’s transformation cannot be attributed to the political success of AKP alone; it was a process in the making over a period of at least fifty years.

It is noted, under the subtitle Power Struggle, “the party took power in 2002 with a mandate to close the political and economic gap between the Kemalist elite and the Anatolian masses.” The AKP struggle is not to close the gap between the two groups, but rather for the Anatolian masses to take over the political and economic power from the elite. They have to do this necessarily by way of disestablishing the Republic’s founding tenets. In this process, the Islamists had to undo the Kemalist modernization reforms, including secularism and national unity perceived as the main obstacles to reaching the uneducated Anatolian masses. Hence, they embarked on a social and national identity restructuring from modernity to traditionality of religion.

Your reporting of the Gulenist movement, under the subtitle Islamist Movement, is perfect. It would have been desirable to have reported, along the actions cited in Netherlands and Russia, some actions against Gulen schools also here in the US, for example in Utah. It is unfortunate that many US academics and politicians, and even the government agencies are embracing this potentially dangerous movement with a mistaken belief that it is the answer to the culture clash with Islam. It is naïve, or maybe motivated by political correctness, to believe that this movement is the moderate Islam in action. The quotations from their leader indicated in your article must be taken note of. It would have been desirable to have mentioned this naïveté in your article.

One misses under the subtitle Media and Business the mention of PMs dozens of law suits going on at all times against journalists or news papers critical of his actions. While his increasingly dictatorial demeanor has been mentioned in the article no examples were given, such as the extent of security entourage around him not seen even in old communist regimes, severe punishments of protesters even if they are teen agers, his harsh treatment of his staff and simple citizens.

Finally, the section on Foreign Policy again accurately indicates that one factor in this policy is the possible trade benefits, but fails to state that it is the only motivation rather than the Ottoman nostalgia. The foreign policy is not motivated by such a grand plan, or by strategic considerations, or national prestige. It is the expectations that the economic power obtained through trade will expedite the spread of the Gulen movement internationally and strengthen the hold of the Islamists domestically. Tradesmanship is peculiar to Muslims. It may be added that the AKP’s insistence on EU membership is also a bargaining stunt. It is a win win situation for the Islamist government. Knowing full well that the EU will not (and should not) accept Turkey’s bid for a variety or reasons, AKP is forcing a refusal that it will exploit for gaining further popularity in the ME and Africa. The Party is well aware that the Arab market and capital is more available than the European one. If, on the other hand, Turkey is really accepted in the Union, then AKP will declare victory over the so-called “Christian club”.

I hope you will find the foregoing comments as useful additions to your article and publish them. However, I plead that you withhold my name because of my serious concern about the capability of retribution by the people mentioned in this note.
August 30, 2010