Getting Off A Streetcar Named De(mocracy)* at
Gezi Station
Many analytical views have already been expressed
while the recent demonstrations in Istanbul, Turkey were unfolding. This is now
a better time, after the dust settled, to try to understand the public
discontent in Turkey. Public protests in Istanbul against government’s
intention to rebuild a historically infamous Ottoman army barracks, which was
demolished in the early Republican years to make room for a public park,
appeared as an environmental issue. Deep down in this young, educated
middle-class group’s mind turned out to be the government’s increasing
authoritarian management serving the PM’s lifelong dream of an Ottomanist
Turkey. The use of excessive police force to disperse the protesters quickly
spread the demonstrations to many cities across the country. The PM’s usual
arrogant and scornful rhetoric helped sustain the protests, which now entered
their second month.
The background
The
mentioning of a few of the PM’s outrageous actions and statements could help
us understand where he has been taking
the country in the last ten years, and why the modern educated class is finally
revolting against him. Courses on Islam were made an important part of the
educational system (some reports show the number of Koran courses as 60.000).
Courses on early republican reforms were gradually replaced by courses on
Islam. The PM publicly declared that the objective is “to raise a religious
youth” (in Afyon, the Regional Director of Education instructed the local Imams, who give the Islamic courses in schools, that they are expected to give guidance to
school principles). On the other hand, public funds appropriated for education
is still the lowest among 34 OECD countries, according to OECD records, 2.9% of
2010 GDP in UNESCO Statistics; of about five million middle school age children
(age 14-17) only about three million (60%) attend school, according to 2008-09
statistics of the Turkish Ministry of National Education; many elementary and
middle schools are converted to Imam schools (of 1450 schools in Istanbul 450
were converted for the school year 2012-13); university presidents are replaced
by academics with stronger Islamic adherence; the Turkish Science and Technology Administration fired the editor of its periodical for having
dedicated its March 2009 issue to Drawin’s birthday, at the same time removing
from its library publications by Dawkins, Moorehead, Gould and
others; only 5% of the workforce is university graduates; World Economic Forum
indices of 2008 show Turkey 72nd in higher education and 66th
in innovation in world ranking. The budget of the Religious Affairs
Administration amounts to $100 million (2007), while all 81 universities’
budgets combined can barely match it. There are 85.000 mosques and 35.000 mosque building
private organizations, and 90.000 imams, while there are only 14.632 public and
private secondary education schools, 6.204 vocational schools (of which 11.4%
are Imam schools anyway), and 235.814 secondary education teachers (Turkish
Ministry of National Education statistics for 2011-12). The UNDP Human Development
Index of 2009 rates Turkey 79th among 182 countries; not because of
her economic but educational level.
2010 Global Gender Gap Index places Turkey 126th among 134 countries. Some dailies onJuly
21, 2010 reported a Cabinet Minister saying the illiteracy rate
among adult women was 13.8% in 2009. A Bogazici University survey in 2010 on
inequalities in Turkey revealed that 70% of the female population under the age of
18 neither attend school nor work. The same survey indicates that the women’s
employment rate has been falling faster than it has in Iran or Saudi Arabia,
from 34% in 1989 to little over 25% in 2010. A 2010 AandG, a Turkish polling
company, survey shows that 47% of married or divorced women were subject to
spousal violence, only 56.2% felt free. Homicide against women increased by
1400% between 2002 and 2009, according to a report by Stop Women Homicide
Platform, a Turkish women’s organization. Requests from courts for permission
to marry underage children had a dramatic increase, including one by the PM to
marry his son in 2003. The PM in his almost daily public statements frequently
lectures the people on his version of social life style. He advocates no
drinking alcohol (often referring to them as drunkards); criticizes artists,
removes statues, attacks TV series; even interferes in what goes on in the
bedrooms by requesting at least three children families, no abortions or
c-section births (progressive women deputies in Parliament called him “vagina
guardian”). During a visit by some women’s organizations, the PM stated that
men and women are not equal, women are complementary to men.
2010 Global Gender Gap Index places Turkey 126th among 134 countries. Some dailies on
He
privatized many nationalized businesses by questionable bidding operations
favoring his followers, privatized national lands and sold them to his
supporters or to some Arab sheiks in exchange for undocumented cash flow into
the country (his defense of Yasin al-Qadi when the latter was accused by the UN
and the US for financing al-Qaida may be recalled). Many mega projects to gain
the followers’ admiration and to carry the PM’s legacy to an eternity are
presumably bankrolled by this income.
He replaced
almost the entire judiciary and public prosecutors with those who are poorly
educated and of his own persuasion (EU Human Rights Court statistics for 2011
show that most of the cases it reviews are from Turkey, 9.000 in 2011 and
15.940 pending, along with countries like Russia, Ukraine, Poland and Romania,
and Turkey leads the list of penalties charged by the EUHRC); the PM’s reaction
to an EUHRC decision upholding the headscarf ban in public schools was that the
matter was for the Islamic clerics to decide, meaning that the Sharia law
should rule, not the Civil law. He changed the entire police force by
dramatically increasing its numbers and materiel to match the military, and
banished the military he feared from politics in compliance with EU
requirements (which effectively replaced one armed force with another to ensure
loyalty); hence he was able to pursue an unrelenting witch hunt against the
military top brass, academia, judges, prosecutors, and journalists of the
reformist/progressive old guard. He intimidated any opposition by personally filing
innumerable suits against them, or by investigations and surveillance based on
fabricated claims. Even school age children who take
part in protests against the PM are detained and prosecuted. Dissent is not tolerated. Freedom House
Reports until 2005 listed Turkey among the free countries, since then it is
listed among the Partly Free.
The national
holidays celebrating the 1920s liberation war, and the reforms of the Republic
are all but abolished as if an undeclared war of vengeance against the reforms
that ended the Sultanate and the Khalifate.
The apolitical modern youth and middle-class people
could no longer expect any meaningful help from the opposition parties, from
the press or the military, for reclaiming the modernization reforms of the
Republic. This group, increasingly falling in a minority status and being
marginalized and frustrated, had no way of expressing its dissent other than by
taking it to the streets.
The authorities’ handling of dissent was
consistent with their past actions and style, the use of the newly empowered
and strengthened police force. The PM unleashed that force with the pretense
that the demonstrations were nothing but “vandalism”, “terrorism”, and “foreign
conspiracy”, all taking advantage of a small legal environmentalist activism.
Even foreign media (especially CNN for its live reporting on the day the police
retook the Gezi Park by brute force -an Islamist daily filed complaint against
the CNN and C. Amanpour), electronic medium (Twitter and Facebook),
international organizations (prominently EU), “interest lobby” (presumably
meaning the international financiers, namely George Soros), and some tourists
in the crowd were all accused of supporting the demonstrations, and subverting
peace and progress in Turkey. These accusations and of course the
identification of the events as terrorism give the PM the pretext for sweeping
arrests. Arrests should be expected to continue for a long time to come if the
witch hunt of the past five years after his re-election were to constitute an
example.
The PM famously said in an address, “democracy is
like a streetcar, you disembark once you reach your destination”. The PM seems
to have reached his “desired” destination at Gezi Park.
What can we expect for Turkey’s future, and what
are the undeniable facts? First, the facts:
1.
No matter how much the PM
denies it, not only his statements but also his deeds prove that he definitely
sees the law and the social system subjected to supreme religious (Islamic)
order. He attributes the failure of the preceding 65 years to secularist
modernization policies. He is vengeful of the republic’s original reforms. This
appears to be his personal conviction and agenda. He is a vindictive, an angry
man.
2.
The PM is changing
Turkey’s social system to conform to the Islamic tradition, with the belief
that this is the mandate given to him by the majority of the country. This
rationalization is also upheld by the Western powers who champion freedom of
religion. He has democracy, freedom, and human rights behind him to put
religion in politics.
3.
The PM has been elected
by a little over 50% of the electorate, who believe that they are Muslims first
and citizens second. (A recent survey by AandG, a Turkish polling company,
shows that over 90% of the population has strong religiosity, and their
understanding of freedom is economic freedom, rather than freedom of speech).
This is the population that was not educated about the republican reforms, and that was
not able to take meaningful part in politics for 65 years after the reformer Ataturk’s
death. Past inapt governments did not make an effort to educate and engage the
public in politics; politics was for the modern minority. Opposition parties
exploited the religiosity of the majority to get them involved in politics.
4.
The modern minority wants
modernizing principles enshrined in the Republican constitution to be preserved
and pursued. Yet, a reversal of majority to modernism does not seem
possible for a foreseeable future, not even an increase in the numbers of modernists to
form a coalition (which means instability and disfunction in governance any
way). A come back of the republican party is also impossible because of public
awareness of its 65 years of inapt governance that was never able to establish
political and social stability, and to develop country’s economic potential.
5.
Neither group should be
expected to change course, for good reason. Religionists cannot change because
of the dogmatic, communal and traditional nature of the religion; moderation
will be sacrilege. Modernists would not change because reason shows that the
future lies in individual freedom and advancement. Turkey is not the only
country that has at least two incongruent societies. There are historical
reasons for this social divide, which I will not dwell on here. It will suffice
to compare some of the political and social principles of both sides:
Modernists want pluralist democracy, traditionalists want majoritarian
democracy; Modernists want liberal individualist society, traditionalists want
to reinstate Ottoman social “ummet” system; Modernists want freedom from
dominance by any one group, person or ideology, traditionalists want freedom
from any dominance except from religion; Modernists want freedom from
capitalist greed, exploitation and commercialization, traditionalists want
capitalism and commercialization.
6.
The problem is the way
democracy is practiced by the government: majoritarian democracy. However,
Turkish democracy is not the only one that interprets democracy as the ballot
box.
What is
next?
Against this backdrop of the political
and social scene, we can attempt to forecast the near future of Turkey. In view
of a polarized society and a polarizing government, which insists on the rule
of the dominant cultural group, the political turmoil of the last 65 years may
continue. Even if the PM were to give some small concessions from his
authoritarian and Ottomanist policy in order not to miss his dream of
inaugurating his mega projects for the 100th anniversary of the
Republic (he has been working towards
leaving a legacy greater than Ataturk’s. He wants to prove that he is greater
than Ataturk),
his electorate’s social pressure on the minority will not subside. Chris
Caldwell rightly wrote in NYT Magazine issue of Sept. 25, 2005 , under the title “The
East in the West”, “In a Turkish context, more democracy generally means more
Islam”. In fact, this is true not only for Turkey but for any Muslim society.
When constitutions were democratically re-written in Algeria, Nigeria, Iraq,
Tunis, Egypt, Libya, Afghanistan, Islam formally became part of the political
process. This is the natural and rightful conclusion of democracy. In a democratic
system the politics and the type of democracy are -and can only be- the
reflection of its people; people get what they want, what they deserve. The
protagonists of democracy, the West, have no grounds for complaining about the
outcome, the Islamic rule.
In a polarized, divided Muslim society (like in
Turkey, Egypt, and potentially in Tunis, Libya, and Algeria), modernists cannot
achieve much more than stopping or modifying a building project. They cannot
change the trend in education, gender gap, judiciary and law enforcement, so
long as the financial power, fire power, judiciary power and legislative power
are all on the side of the Islamists. Religion is more powerful than any other
social asset. Therefore, Turkey’s Ottomanist domestic policy may succeed.
Will Turkish government’s Ottomanist foreign
policy have repercussions on the international scene? The government obviously
pursues a foreign policy of reviving Ottoman glory by establishing a sphere of
influence in the neighboring, Middle Eastern, and African states. (Foreign
Minister reportedly stated at his Party’s 14th Consultation and
Evaluation Meeting “We have Ottoman heritage. Yes, we are Neo-Ottomanist. We
have to be interested in neighboring and North African states”, although he
later denied that statement. Also 2010 German Marshall Fund Transatlantic
Trends reports that 20% of Turks are favorable to co-operation with the ME
countries, 13% with the EU, 6% with the US, 5% with Russia, and 34% with no
co-operation at all). The objective of this policy is to gain a prominent
position for Turkey in the international stage, particularly in the Islamic
countries and in the EU. To seek leadership among the Islamic countries by
Israel bashing and by business relations based on Muslim brotherhood will not
carry Turkey to ME leadership for at least two reasons. Arab spring and the
current developments in Egypt demonstrate that there is an awakening also in
Arab countries. Their societies will be as divided as Turkey’s at best. Second, Ottoman
experience abundantly proved that Arabs are not reliable partners, religious
ties are not sufficient to bring together culturally different societies.
Therefore, while Turkey may aspire to such leadership, even if it resurrected
the Khalifate, Arab world would not recognize it. Turkey cannot be a big or
equal brother to Iran either, not only because history shows us so, but also
because they are relatively equal powers aspiring to the leadership in the same
region. Therefore, Turkey’s Ottomanist foreign policy will not succeed.
Some analysts are of the opinion that the EU must
expedite Turkey’s admission into the Union in order to avoid Turkey’ further
slippage towards the Islamic world. It must be borne in mind that Turkey wants
to join the EU with her own social values. The EU is against it, aware that
this will expedite Europe’s Islamization, which has already begun with the
increasing migrant population from its Mediterranean littoral neighbors. The
sheer size of Turkey’s under-educated and non-modern population, and her
promising economy will give her in the EU governing bodies an equal standing
with Germany and France. Had Turkey been admitted to the Union as early as
possible and before the end of the Cold War at the latest, and had religion was
not allowed to be a tool of politicking, she would not have become Islamist. It
is now too late to reverse the Islamization process. Turkey’s EU membership
will become a mute issue.
There are also some analysts who are of the
opinion that Turkey proves that an Islamic country can be democratic, modern,
moderate, and secular; as such, it should be promoted among fundamentalist
Muslim countries. These analysts must be denying the facts that in Turkey
democracy means only voting rights and religious freedom, not free speech
rights; modernity means to be up-to-date with material things (brought about by
economic success); moderation and secularism are absurd in Islamic beliefs,
unless secularism is the type of secularism applied in the US. These arguments
are no more than a wishful thinking.
The question is not whether Turkey will
eventually become like Iran’s Khomeinyites, Egypt’s Brotherhood, or
Afganistan’s Taliban, but whether it will be an Arab style country which is not
modern, moderate, or secular, but a non-fundamentalist Islamist country that does not constitute a
threat to the West.
*A metaphor of a 1947 play titled “A Streetcar Named Desire”,
written by Tennessee Williams and immortalized by a movie starring Marlon
Brando.
July 5, 2013