A politically just reprisal to Putin’s assault on Ukraine

 

How a war ends is unpredictable, but evidently the era in which the powerful attacker won over the smaller or failing nations is over. In the present time where there are international agreements or, in their absence, international norms regarding rights and obligations of states, the attacked nation musters national courage and international support to defend itself based on those agreements and norms. In other words, the attacker’s action is now illegitimate, and the attacked’s defense garners international backing. This is the result of having advanced in the journey towards the civilizational pinnacle. Hence, in the ongoing Russian invasion, Ukrainian defense has the better chance of winning. The emphasis of success here is in the concept of defense. So far as Ukraine fights for defending its land and recovering what has been invaded, she will have the will to fight and will have the support of members of the international community. Ukraine’s unexpected will to resist and the material and/or rhetorical support by many in the international community is a testament to this forecast.

 Nevertheless, there are several states that consider that Putin’s attack on Ukraine was brought on by the Western block’s extension of its economic supremacy to the unwelcome strategic and political fields (NATO and EU). They withhold their support to Ukraine on that premise. Whereas the West’s position is that its support and assistance to Ukraine is not for supremacy, but for “the defense of the rule of law”. Yet, many states refrain from lending their support. This contrariness is understandable for those who are politically or economically beholden to Russia. The appreciation of the reasons why the West’s position is not found believable by the rest may help the West in the way it will handle the future of this war.

 The West’s position expressed as “the defense of the rule of law” rings hollow for at least two reasons. It is too imprecise as to which rule of law is meant by it. And it leaves a condescending echo on the less powerful countries in question because of their historical sensitivities towards the occasional discrepancies between the West’s rhetoric and action. “Defense of rule of law” raises questions: Is the referenced law a Western law, and who authorized the West to enforce the law?

It is commonplace that leaders need knowledge, power, and authority to lead. Followers recognize leadership because they are less powerful, not necessarily less knowledgeable; they do not want to follow by force or deceit, but with dignity, as part of the process, not as a thrall. Therefore, the US would be more persuasive in relations if she were to keep the discourse within international terms and avoid giving the appearance of national interests and bullying. There is no need to reaffirm national interests. Negotiators of all sides in foreign relations keep that factor in mind even if it is not expressed.  

It is important to bear in mind in all dealings with countries that emerged after WWII not to have national or Western political and/or strategic motives, or if there are such motives to be truthful about them. This is necessitated by the fact that several European countries have bad colonial reputations, and the US has lost her benevolent-power accolade she got right after WWII as a result of her numerous but some unnecessary and failed, interventions since. Not only US diplomacy also US politicians and media have to stop: 1- the constant boasting of greatness, exceptionalism, supremacy, and power, in order to avoid being blamed with bullying, righteousness and condescension when the time comes for need for international support; 2- the analyzing and judging international matters and discourse against the US criteria, culture, and interests, in order to avoid the perception or misinterpretation for an ideological or political motive.

Therefore, it would help if West would make it clear that assistance to Ukraine is for “the defense of internationally agreed peace and sovereignty principles”*; not for the establishment of a certain regime in Ukraine, nor is it for strategic advantage. The reason for following the West would then be clear to all concerned. The mistaken perception about Western hidden agenda would be overcome. More importantly, such rhetoric will make those states inclusive in the process, thus rendering legitimacy to their decision to participate. Let us not forget that all countries, big or small, right or left, want “peace and sovereignty”.

 As to ending the ongoing war, the parameters of a feasible, realistic end are as follows: 1- A decisive military defeat by, a change of heart or an internal uprising in Russia which will ensue withdrawal from the territory it invaded is unrealistic. A complete withdrawal of Russia from Ukraine to the borders that it agreed to in 1994 Budapest Memorandum would mean its acceptance of a complete defeat by -what turned out to be- the paper tiger; although this (in addition to war reparations for the vast devastation it caused) would be the most just resolution of the assault perpetrated by Russia. It is equally unrealistic to expect a complete military victory by Ukraine, i.e. for her to reoccupy and hold the entire invaded territory within a short period without losing much more life and treasure.

2-     The only alternative seems to be a negotiated compromise in which Russia will gain less territory than what it set out to gain but at a cost of paying hefty reparations and war crime sentences, and Ukraine will lose less territory than it would have otherwise, at a gain of even better value of NATO and EU membership (which Russia used as an excuse for its folly in the first place).

3-     Such negotiation will be possible only if and when Ukraine firmly reoccupies the entire land corridor to Crimea which Russia allegedly annexed, and it stops short of reoccupying Crimea. It cannot expect to reoccupy Crimea as Putin would do anything to hold on to it, despite the fact that the international law is on the side of Ukraine.

4-     A negotiated settlement regarding Crimea, preferably, may only refer to that land as the 2014 fait accompli (or some other ambiguous statement) without expressly assigning any status to Crimea (an ambiguity carries a hope that a future opportunity may open a possible way out from the mistake the West made by not having acted decisively in 2014). A provision for the repatriation of Crimean Tatars and the return of previous Ukrainian habitants on grounds of human rights and dignity would be very important.

5-     A formally declared request and support for negotiation of as many as possible members of the international community (prominently with the inclusion of China, which is very likely) will be sine qua non of the success of such a settlement, The call for peace negotiation should not appear as a Western block call, but an international call putting Russia in isolation. Such request and support may be achieved through a UNGA resolution tasking the Security Council with it.

           

*  Like the UN Charter of 1945, the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 recognizing the independence of Ukraine in exchange of desisting her nuclear weapons, 1997 Cooperation and Security Agreement Between NATO and Russia, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) of 1990 from which Russia withdrew after 2014.                                                                                      

 June 9, 2023